also know that Mucius' use of genera was taken up and refined by his younger contemporary Servius, as well as many prominent lawyers after him, and that Mucius' student Cicero advocated the creation of an ars iuris civilis, wherein the entire civil law code would be organized hierarchically into categories and subcategories.8 One could postulate, therefore, that in this intellectual climate a conceptual principle or generic heading such as 'law of persons' might well have arisen.
Against this, however, we must take into account the prevailing scholarly opinion that, overall, Roman jurists made only minimal use of genus as an organizing tool in their writings. According to Wieacker, Mucius' genera are of the fourth and fifth level, without any possibility for subcategories below them; and likewise, Watson finds no use of species in Republican law.9 Moreover, there is no hard evidence that Mucius or any lawyer before Gaius created an overview of civil law using broad concepts or headings on the order of 'law of persons'. Accordingly, many scholars, perhaps the majority, have argued for the originality of Gaius, maintaining that the systemization of private law, in any meaningful sense of that word, begins with the Institutes.10
Yet this objection may skew the evidence, for it focuses only on the upper echelon of Roman legal literature. Gaius' Institutes, by contrast, is literature of a very low order: a textbook or primer, not for lawyers or even law students, but for students receiving formal legal instruction as part of a liberal education." In turn, Gaius' pedagogical concerns, which may have included an organized presentation of his subject accessible to those outside the legal profession, would not have been shared by prominent legal writers such as Mucius, Servius, Alfenus, Sabinus, or Neratius.'2 Moreover, as Frier has made clear, Mucius' larger agenda for transforming the legal profession actually militated against the use of genera and the creation of a grand system of civil law such as Cicero envisioned.'3 Thus, Cicero's efforts to promote an ars iuris civilis should not be seen as a failed attempt to extend Mucius' innovation to its natural conclusion in the professional legal literature, but as a new direction altogether, aimed at the classroom.
In light of this, it is at least plausible to postulate that running alongside the To be sure, there is nothing necessary or inevitable about this suggested development. As Honor6 has observed, the oral exposition of law need not give rise to system or be dependent on it.15 Nevertheless, I find this hypothesis of a lower-level, oral tradition attractive inasmuch as it is able to explain how an advanced systemization of the civil code could appear seemingly out of nowhere in the mid-second century A.D., without appealing to the genius and originality of an otherwise obscure 'Gaius'. It may also provide the most satisfying explanation as to why this singular achievement, despite its popularity (as attested by the papyri and its very survival), had no discernible impact on the legal profession for more than two and a half centuries after its publication.16
Returning to the phrase ius personarum: if, as I am suggesting, Gaius' work belonged to a minor, oral tradition, isolated from the interests of mainstream lawyers, then the appearance of this phrase in his Institutes may not mark a dramatic development in second-century legal science. Rather, it may be the product of an evolving tradition of advanced liberal education. For the married woman is bound by law to the living husband. But if the husband dies, she is released from the law of the husband. Thus, while the husband lives, she will be considered an adulteress if she marries another man;18 but if the husband dies, she is free from the law, to the end that she is not an adulteress if she marries another man.
Thus even though 7.2-3 is quite obviously intended to illustrate the legal principle in 7.1 (as indicated by the introductory ydp), the principle, in this understanding, speaks of a person being governed by the law as long as that person lives, while the illustration speaks of a wife being bound to her husband for as long as her husband lives. To put the matter another way, the 'person' in 7.1 does not correspond to any of those mentioned in 7.2-3: not the husband, the wife, or the 'other man'.
This inconsistency has long been recognized, and over the centuries several solutions have been offered, none of which is very satisfying. These include an allegorical interpretation of the passage in which the law is understood to be the first husband, the wife the redeemed self, and so on; several attempts to smooth over or ignore the difficulty by focusing attention on Paul's 'overall meaning' or describing 7.2-3 as a 'corollary' or 'tertium comparationis' to the principle in 7.1; efforts to identify different types of analogical thinking used by Paul, such as 'sequential analogy'; and, finally, the simple admission that the passage just does not make sense on any level.'9
Rather than choosing from among these competing solutions, concerning which there is no scholarly consensus in sight, I would like to suggest that the problem may be solved by translating the legal principle in 7 Third, my translation explains why Paul introduces the legal principle in 7.1 with the words 'for I speak to ones who know law'. In the traditional reading there would seem to be no reason for this elaborate introduction (found only here in Paul), for the principle that law governs people only during their own lifetimes is common sense. Moreover, not only has Paul already begun the verse with an introduction that would appear sufficient for this ('Or, do you not know, brothers.. .'23), but he has introduced a similar notion without comment earlier in 6.7-14.24 Beyond this, in Galatians 3.15 he uses a more complex example involving the ratification and annulment of a person's will, introducing it simply as 'common knowledge' (KaTd av Opwrvo AE'yw); and in Galatians 4.1-2 he makes reference to inheritance law and the age of majority without any explanatory introduction. If, however, we adopt the suggestion that 'the law of the person' is a piece of legal jargon, then Paul's elaborate introduction would serve to alert his audience to the fact that a certain degree of legal expertise is required to appreciate his argument.
In sum, there seems to be ample reason to reject the traditional understanding of Romans 7.1 in favour of the one offered here. When Paul wrote 6 v'Los, KVPEptEEL 70o avOpcw"rov, he meant 'the law of the person has jurisdiction .. .', not 'the law has jurisdiction over a person'.
Finally, let me return to my proposal above that 'the law of the person' has a technical legal ring to it. This notion is suggested by the distinctiveness, or one might 21 Indeed, the latter phrase has been fairly mysterious to some biblical scholars. C. K. To begin with, we should recognize that most New Testament scholars rule out this possibility altogether, contending that vdo'os in 7.1 refers to Mosaic Law, or Torah, rather than Roman (or Greek) law. They note that vo4pos usually has this meaning in Paul, and that in 7.4-6, where Paul applies the principal of 7.1, vdo'os clearly means Torah. In their view, it is unreasonable to think that Paul would move so casually from one system of law to another in the space of so few verses.35 The weakness of this argument is twofold. First, it is dependent on the traditional translation of the principle in 7.1, 'the law has jurisdiction over a person as long as he lives'. While this principle is not found in the Torah per se, these scholars assume that it is of such an obvious and general nature that Paul could easily attribute it to the Torah without further ado. Yet not only does this assumption fit poorly with Paul's address to his readers as 'ones who know law', which seems to presuppose more than just general knowledge (see above), but if, as I have argued, the principle in 7.1 should be translated as 'the law of the person has jurisdiction . .
.', then its absence from the Torah becomes very problematic, for there is nothing obvious about it (and hence Paul's illustration of it in 7.2-3).
Second, the argument overlooks Paul's use of vo'4os in 7.2-3, where it surely means something other than Torah. This becomes clear if we compare 7.2-3 to Deuteronomy 24.1-4 (LXX). In that passage we are told that if a woman is divorced by her husband, marries another man (ydv'Trat-t v3ptPL drE'p,), and then is released from the second marriage by divorce or the death of the second husband, she may not remarry the first husband. The assumption here is that a woman may lawfully marry a second time while her first husband is still alive, an assumption not contradicted elsewhere in the Torah. This, however, is the opposite of what Paul claims in Romans 7.2-3, namely that a wife is 'bound by law to the living husband', and that 'while the husband lives, she will be considered an adulteress if she marries another man' (yE'V-ral dJv8p OrE'pcg). Since Paul uses the same Hebrew idiom for marrying as does the Mosaic passage, it is quite possible, moreover, that the wording of Romans 7.2-3 is an allusion to the Mosaic ruling and was actually formulated in opposition to it.36 Indeed, the most likely provenance of the tradition in 7.2-3 is not the Torah but Jesus' prohibition of divorce as found in the Gospels. a wide currency by this time. Perhaps it had already achieved an authoritative standing in some of the more humble circles of legal education. From this we could infer that its origins lie somewhere in the first half of the first century A.D. Alternatively, it may have only recently become a subject of discussion. In this case we could understand Romans 7.1 as a reference to one of the latest advances in legal pedagogy, and we could locate the origins of iuspersonarum toward the middle of the first century.
To the extent that this conclusion seems reasonable, it holds important implications for the history of the conceptualization of Roman law, and perhaps also for the development of the Institutionensystem. By comparing Paul and Gaius we have determined that a principle entitled iuspersonarum/6 vdtos 70rol vOpthrrov existed at least a century before its appearance in the Institutes. Moreover, it was used at that time to conceptualize the logic of private laws-potentially a broad range of these laws-that pertained to the legal status of one person during another's lifetime. Thus, there is evidence that elements of the civil code were being systematized by means of legal principles already in early classical law. When iuspersonarum finally surfaces in Gaius, this tendency is even more pronounced. Here the phrase stands somewhere between a principle and a category of law, a situation made possible by the ambiguity of ius in Gaius' day. Thus Gaius uses ius personarum in the same way he uses the simpler designations res and actiones, as titles for the three divisions of civil law.
At minimum, this reading of the evidence raises questions about the pace at which the systemization of law took place between these two points, Paul and Gaius, and hence also about Gaius' own creativity and contribution to the process. In the face of such questions, it will be more difficult for scholars to defend the view that Gaius' systemization of Roman civil law was entirely original. In turn, those holding the more cautious view, that the Institutionensystem was the creation of 'Gaius or an unknown predecessor',56 will find it incumbent upon them to explore more explicitly the possibility that this predecessor belonged not to Gaius' century but to the one before.
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